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RELIGION, POST-RELIGIONISM, AND RELIGIONING: 
RELIGIOUS STUDIES 
AND CONTEMPORARY CULTURAL DEBATES1 
MALORY NYE 
The interaction between the contemporary study of religion and contemporary 
cultural debates has tended to be marked by indifference, and there have been 
relatively few attempts to engage with the discourses of postmodern theory. In this 
paper I examine some of the ways in which recent anthropologists have sought to 
question some of their basic disciplinary assumptions with regard to the 'culture 
concept', particularly by putting forward strategies of 'writing against culture' or by 
writing culture in more dynamic terms (as cultural or culturing). This insight, 
which is relevant in itself to the contemporary study of religion, can be extended to 
a re-evaluation of the 'religion' concept, which I suggest could be reconstructed in 
terms of practice theory as religious practice or religioning. In conclusion I argue 
that to maintain its relevance within the broad field of contemporary humanities 
scholarship, the discipline of religious studies needs to aligrt itself more clearly 
(theoretically and methodologically) with the dynamic interface between the ap- 
proaches of cultural anthropology, cultural theory, and other postmodern' theoreti- 
cal discourses. 
1. A vikw fiom/gf anthropology 
For some people working within the discipline of religious studies it 
may come as a surprise to reflect on the considerable crises and 
'culture wars' that are raging through many areas of humanities 
scholarship. Sometimes it appears that religious studies has become 
an academic backwater, whose main protagonists are happy to ig- 
' Versions of the argument in this paper have been presented in various contexts, 
including the British Association for the Study of Religion annual conference in 
Stirling, the Department of Religious Studies, University of Lancaster, and the 
Beckett Institute, Oxford University. I would like to thank the following for useful 
comments and suggestions on the ideas which I am presenting: Steve Sutcline, 
Simon Coleman, Mary Keller, Nicole Bourque, Corinne Dempsey, Robert Segal, 
Kim Knott, Ian Reader, Dominic Corrywright, Russell McCutcheon, Ann Grodzins 
Gold, Cat McEarchem, Aislinn Jones, Judith Macpherson, and Kerry Huntly. 
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nore and avoid the conceptual chaos which is raging around them.2 
2 
Despite being a group of scholars who pride themselves on their 
. multidisciplinarity and interdisciplinarity, the direction of religious 
studies as a discipline seems to have been left relatively unaffected so 
far by the development of postmodernism and critical theory (not to 
mention a host of other late twentieth-century conceptual develop- 
ments). 
As a social anthropologist I find myself somewhat bemused and 
confused by the resolute determination of the discipline of religious 
studies to avoid some pretty fundamental developments. As an un- 
dergraduate student in London in the mid 1980s, I was in one of the 
first classes to find Levi-Straussian structuralism irrelevant and non- 
sensical. The elaborate ethnographic frameworks of binary opposi- 
tions that had so excited a previous generation of students and pro- 
duced such turgid (and abstract) ethnographic accounts seemed to 
pass most of my class by, and to this day I can see that to be an 
anthropologist of religion (or indeed a religion scholar) it is possible to 
take-or-leave Claude L6vi-Strauss and his grand semiology. (In this 
sense, if not in any other way, I could claim-along with other an- 
thropologists of my generation-the identity of a 'post-structuralist'.) 
However, developments in anthropology, and indeed other disci- 
plines, from the mid 1980s onwards will not, I argue, be so easy to 
ignore. 
The first major shake-up of anthropology in this era came with the 
publication of James Clifford and George Marcus's collection of pa- 
pers called Writing Culture (1986). Although not received with over- 
whelming enthusiasm by all anthropologists (see, for example, 
Mascia-Lees et al. 1989), the volume raised a number of extremely 
significant questions about the processes of ethnographic representa- 
tion. In particular it brought to the fore the perspective that ethnog- 
raphy is more than simply done 'in the field', it is equally created 
through the literate strategies of anthropological authors. The classic 
ethnographic writings of the 'sacred cows' of anthropology (particu- 
larly Bronislaw Malinowski and Edward Evans-Pritchard) were de- 
. constructed to demonstrate some of the politics (as well as poetics) of 
the circumstances under which they were written. I think it is no 
2 For example, Ernest Gellner's reactionary book Postmodernism, Reason, and Religion 
(Gellner 1992) is commonly used as the definitive guide to postmodern thinking on 
the role of religion in contemporary culture. 
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understatement to say that following the widespread dissemination of 
this book, the task of anthropological writing could never the same 
again. Returning from 'the field' to one's desk and 'writing up' re- 
search involves more than simply blending description with theory; 
the very act of writing a particular type of text is a discursive strategy 
which constructs through representation the 'reality' that the text 
takes as its object. 
The debates about Writing Culture have not stood still over the past 
ten or so years (see Spencer 1989; James and Hockey 1998; Moore 
1994), and I would guess that anthropologists are still as unsure at the 
end of the decade about what they could or should do with the 
processes of writing cultures/ethnographies as they were at the begin- 
ning. On top of these questions have been added a number of other 
fundamentals about the processes of being and doing anthropology, 
such as the role of culture within anthropological discourses (Abu- 
Lughod 1991; Keesing 1994), the intense relationships of power and 
personality between anthropologists, their informants (now a difficult 
term), and their colleagues (Okely 1996; Said 1989), and also the 
boundedness of the places where they do their fieldwork (Appardurai 
1986; Gupta and Ferguson 1982; Clifford 1997). All this has become 
bound up with the fundamental question of what anthropologists 
think they are doing, and the political relations between western 
academia and diverse cultural and political groups ('the rest') which 
were framed for the formative years of the discipline under the struc- 
tures of colonialism (Asad 1973). Whatever may now be the practices 
of anthropologists, contemporary proponents of the discipline cannot 
ignore its colonial roots and its postcolonial inheritance. 
2. Crisis? What crisis? 
' ' 
When considering these debates, I find it remarkable that there have 
been few echoes of this within the discourses of religious studies. Is 
the writing of religion any different from the writing of culture 
(McCarthy Brown [1991] gives some interesting pointers in this re- 
spect), and what are the relations of power between the discourses 
that religion scholars produce and the manifestations and people they 
are seeking to analyze? On a wider level, the emerging disciplines of 
cultural studies, postmodernism, poststructuralism, and postcolonial- 
ism are generating wave after wave of questions about academic as 
well as cultural (and religious) practice which have only occasionally 
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(and very recently) begun to spill over into the pages of leading reli- 
gion journals.' When one looks at religious studies, the question that 
I find needs to be asked is, "Where is 'post-religionism'?". 
On some occasions it appears to me that the disciplines of religious 
studies and anthropology have been diverging rather than converg- 
ing in recent years. Scholars of religion have been prepared to take 
on board some of the innovations in theory and methodology that 
were on offer from previous generations of anthropologists at the 
beginning of the 1990s, particularly Clifford Geertz's (1973) herme- 
neutic/symbolic analysis, along with Victor Turner's and Mary 
Douglas's symbolic functionalism. Fieldwork as one of many method- 
ologies is now a serious research path for the would-be scholar, al- 
though the place and politics of the research is usually left distinctly 
hidden in the texts that are produced. This arrival of anthropology- 
and, to a much greater extent, of sociology-has produced a change 
from the formative phenomenological model of religious studies that 
was associated with Ninian Smart and the University of Lancaster in 
the 1970s. The development of a 'new Lancaster' model, associated 
with writers such as Richard Roberts and Paul Heelas, means that 
we can perhaps talk of a religious studies which is now post-pheno- 
menological, or post-Smartian (see, for example, Heelas 1998). But 
there remains a strong resistance to exploring the theoretical and 
methodological critiques of postmodern theory within the broader 
discipline. 
Where there has been any serious engagement between post- 
modem theory and the study of religion it has often been Christian 
theologians at the vanguard, delighting in the textual emphases of the 
deconstructionism of Derrida and Lacan. One of the first things that 
I leamt when I started teaching within a department of religious 
studies (and indeed one of the first things I and others teach new and 
prospective students) is that the study of religion is different from 
theology. The establishment of the discipline-certainly within Euro- 
pean contexts, and still to a large extent in North America-has been 
fought with Christian theology as the significant other: the maxim is 
that the study of religion is not the same as the doing of theology. 
With this in mind, the development of postmodern (particularly post- 
structuralist) discourses within certain branches of theology in Europe 
3 See, for example, Chidester (1996, 1998), Fitzgerald (1995, 1997, 1999), Geertz 
(1994), Strenski (1998), and Taylor (1998). 
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and North America will most likely lead to a further bifurcation of 
religious studies and the wider developments within anthropology 
and cultural studies. More generally, my impression is that scholars 
of religion have been so taken up with perpetuating and maintaining 
a discipline of religious studies for themselves theology and 
theologians4 that they have failed to notice that the wider vista out- 
side these narrow confines has been rapidly changing. If other disci- 
plines are any indication of possible future developments, it appears 
that the theoretical edge of religious studies is likely either to signifi- 
cantly stagnate over the next decade, or otherwise to become en- 
gulfed by a considerable shake-up and 'postmodem crisis'. 
3. Rethinking culture 
To take one example of my contention with the current practice of 
religious studies, I intend to explore in this paper certain conceptual- 
izations of what is generally perceived as being the subject matter of 
the discipline, that is 'religion'. This term is still widely (universally) 
used in the discipline, even though there is almost equivalent recog- 
nition that it is inadequate (W. C. Smith 1978). 'We know' that the 
concept of religion is a trope, or a typology, that it is untranslatable 
into many of the languages that religion scholars work in, and that it 
' 
bears little relation to any 'emic' discourses. This notwithstanding, 
there remains a considerable taken-for-grantedness about it, since it 
seems to work well enough (most of the time) and there does not 
seem to be enough at stake to question use of the word or to find an 
alternative conceptualization. As I will discuss later, as long ago as 
1983 the anthropologist Talal Asad wrote an extensive critique of the 
4 The majority of religious studies departments in Britain operate within the con- 
text of units which contain (and often are dominated by) Christian theologians. 
There are exceptions to this, for example, at Lancaster, Bath, SOAS, and my own 
department in Stirling. However, it is still remarkable to note that Stirling is the only 
place where religious studies is taught in Scotland as an autonomous subject from 
theology (divinity). At a wider political level, the panel for assessment for the govern- 
ment-led Research Assessment Exercise in Britain condenses religious studies and 
theology as a distinct discipline (with religious studies being a sub-area alongside 
Christian theology and biblical Studies). The evaluations that this panel makes of 
individuals' and departments' research value have very significant effects on funding 
levels and appointments. It is worth noting that there have been very few attempts to 
argue that religious studies departments should be assessed by panels other than 
theology. 
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conceptualization of the term 'religion', which was published in Man 
- the leading journal of British social anthropology.' It seems that the 
politics of perpetuating religious studies as a discipline has taken pri- 
ority over any sustained attempt to examine the political strategies 
that underline the construction of religion as an object. 
Before I pursue this deconstruction of religion, however, I wish to 
examine some anthropological discourses to review how a similar, 
indeed related, concept has been thoroughly debated and prob- 
lematized in recent years. That is the term 'culture', which has (cer- 
tainly as far as North American anthropology is concerned) been as 
foundational a concept in anthropology as religion has been in reli- 
gious studies. I pursue this strategy not only because of the interesting 
and helpful developments that have been made to rethink culture, 
but also because the conceptualization of religion as culture (in some 
form or other) is a strong element of contemporary religious studies 
particularly through the incorporation of the theoretical work of 
Clifford Geertz (particularly Geertz 1 973a). 
If there is a 'traditional' (or pre-postmodem) understanding of cul- 
ture in anthropology, then it lies somewhere between Edward. B. 
Tylor and Clifford Geertz. For Tylor, "Culture or Civilization, taken 
in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes 
knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities 
and habits acquired by man [sic] as a member of society" (1871 : 1). 
With a little more sophistication, and many more years of direct 
ethnographic experience to his credit, Clinbrd Geertz was able to 
assert, nearly a century later, that for him "man [sic] is an animal 
suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun", and that 
' I must note here that it took until 1995 for the publishers of Man to finally agree 
that the title was anachronistic and that it should be changed (to the, much less 
snappy, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute). However, if the leading lights of 
anthropological discourses appear slow to respond to issues of gender inclusivity in 
language there are some within religious studies who are positively procrustean. In 
the summer of 1999 the religious-studies-uk mailbase (email) discussion list saw a 
series of flame postings from senior academics when a (female) member of the list 
questioned a previous posting that had described religion as "an important part of 
man's experience". Although a substantial number of contributors rejected such a 
position, a significant minority assertively argued that the term 'man' should be under- 
stood inclusively. 6 Culture is also becoming a debated term within religious studies through an- 
other route, that is through the tentative engagements with cultural studies where the 
'culture concept' is being put hard to work. I will be coming back to some of these 
issues later in the paper. 
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culture is those webs (1973b: 5). Elsewhere, in his classic "Religion as 
a Cultural System" article, he draws this out further to suggest that 
culture 
denotes an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in 
symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms 
by means of which men [sic] communicate, perpetuate, and develop 
their knowledge about and attitudes towards life. (1973a: 89) 
For many anthropologists (and indeed many scholars of religion) this 
is what culture 'is': what the study of culture should be looking for, 
and at, is a thing which is manifest in people and is transmitted from 
generation to generation, from context to context.? 
7 
Against this approach, the critical re-evaluation of the culture con- 
cept has largely been a product of the debates emerging out of the 
'writing culture' school. Thus James Clifford wrote in his introduc- 
tion to that volume that, "Cultures are not scientific 'objects' (assum- 
ing such things exist, even in natural sciences). Culture, and views of 
'it', are produced historically, and are actively contested.... If 'culture' 
is not an object to be described, neither is it a unified corpus of 
symbols and meanings that can be definitively interpreted" (1986: 
18-19). The proposition that the 'cultures' of ethnographic writing 
are discursive rather than encapsulated essences provides a radical 
perspective which could very easily slip into the relativist position 
that there are no cultures, merely textual (and other discursive ver- 
sions) of what is thought to be culture. For many anthropologists this 
strong critique is a justifiable one. There is certainly a great deal of 
mileage to be extracted from the argument that 'other cultures' are 
produced through textual strategies of representation, and that these 
are largely derived from the hegemonic western positions that 
Edward Said labeled as Orientalism (1978). Whether or not this dis- 
solves anthropology or opens up new and exciting prospects is still 
being strongly contested, but anthropologists are keenly aware of the 
fact that differences between people are important-and it can be 
' The concept of culture is nuanced in ways other than this, particularly as a 
means of describing "the sum total of superior, morally and spiritually edifying 
human accomplishments" (Masuzawa 1998: 71). For a careful and sophisticated 
discussion of the complex interplay between these two different ideas of culture, 
Masuzawa's article is a very useful introduction. See also Lincoln (2000). For an 
argument against anthropological (and anthropology-derived) appropriations of the 
concept of culture, see McCauley and Lawson (1996). 
Downloaded from Brill.com12/20/2019 12:49:00PM
via University of Glasgow
454 
useful to talk of some of these differences as cultural differences. The 
question left unaswered, however, is "How does one talk of such 
differences?", or "What makes the difference, in the first place?". 
Taking as her starting point the exclusion of feminists and 
`halfies'8 in the discourses of writing culture, Lila Abu-Lughod wrote 
that the term culture "operates in anthropological discourse to en- 
force separations that inevitably carry a sense of hierarchy" (1991: 
137-38). Thus, talking of cultures and cultural differences sets up a 
self and an other which is difficult to transgress. For feminist or halfie 
anthropologists such transgression therefore goes against the grain of 
anthropology: an anthropological dilemma arises when the self the 
feminists or halfies assume themselves to be seems to be situated 
somewhere between the cultures of the self and other. "Standing on 
shifting ground makes it clear that every view is a view from some- 
where and every act of speaking a speaking from somewhere" (141). 
However, the talk of cultures and cultural differences leaves no space 
for such a positionality. Thus, "if 'culture', shadowed by coherence, 
timelessness, and discreteness, is the prime anthropological tool for 
making 'other', and difference ... tends to be a relationship of power, 
then perhaps anthropologists should consider strategies for writing 
against culture" ( 147; emphasis added). 
The strategies she proposes are diverse and exciting, suggesting 
that the processes of writing ethnography should focus on discourses 
and practices, in tracing of global and historical connections, and the 
uncovering of particularities. The intention is to write about those 
aspects of the practice of life as observed (with the contradictions and 
politics that this involves), rather than attempting to provide more 
abstract frameworks. In doing so Abu-Lughod argues that the writing 
should work against the over-determinations of a generalizing culture 
concept and provide a more reflective means of representing the 
contexts in which anthropologists work. 
A rather different (and perhaps more traditional) approach is put 
forward by Roger Keesing (1994), who in a provocative article tries 
to rescue back for anthropology the distinctive edge that the 'culture 
concept' used to have. In particular he looks towards the use by other 
8 Abu-Lughod defines 'halfies' as "people whose national or cultural identity is 
mixed by virtue of migration, overseas education, or parentage" (1991: 137), and as 
such is a personal descriptor which overlaps to a considerable degree with the more 
widely used concept of 'hybridity'. 
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scholars-particularly in cultural studies-of the term culture, but 
very often with a quite different approach. He asks if there is any 
point of connection between these two quite difierent conceptualiza- 
tions of culture-in cultural anthropology and cultural studies-and 
to what degree are there any continuities (and differences) between 
them? Writing in the early 1990s, it was clear that there had been 
considerable resistance by anthropologists to the critiques offered 
from cultural studies and postmodern perspectives, and though he 
wished to distance himself from some of the arguments, Keesing felt 
there should be some rapprochement. In his attempt to rejuvenate 
anthropology's discourses on culture, he points to the fundamental 
problem that anthropologists find it all too easy to talk of culture in a 
taken-for-granted way, assuming that cultures are like 'coral reefs' 
with a "cumulated accretion of minute deposits, essentially un- 
knowable, and irrelevant to the shapes they form" (Keesing 1994: 
301). 
Thus anthropologists continue to talk "as if 'a culture' was an 
agcnt that could do things; or as if 'a culture' was a collectivity of 
people" (302). Although anthropologists know that this is a mislead- 
ing way to talk, "we don't really mean that 'Balinese culture' does or 
believes anything, or that it lives on the island of Bali (it is all a kind 
of 'shorthand'); but I fear that our common ways of talk channel our 
thought in these directions" (302). Elaborating on this, Keesing ar- 
gues that the essentialism of such a discourse reflects "vested discipli- 
nary interests in characterizing exotic otherness" (303). Hence the 
experience for many (western) anthropologists is to travel to remote 
communities (such as in New Guinea or the Amazon region) looking 
for such a 'culture', only to find the people there "listening to transis- 
tor radios or watching videos..., going to church and attending 
schools instead of conducting rituals in men's houses" (303). Instead 
of asking questions and deriving theories from this actual experience, 
the ethnographic product is based on a belief "that their essential 
culturalness lives on despite the outward changes in their lives" (303). 
What Keesing is arguing, therefore, is that-against Geertz-it is 
misleading to think of the 'webs of significance' that are called culture 
as something that is dumped on people by their society, and that exists 
in a concrete form like a coral reef. What is called culture-through 
intellectual and discursive laziness, mainly because it is very hard to 
think of an alternative way of describing `it'-is instead a location 
which is largely constructed by a person's situation in particular so- 
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cial-structural circumstances (according to class, gender, age, ethnic- 
ity, and other factors). But a person's performance of culture-how 
they do or live such a placement-also comes out of the dynamics of 
diverse structural influences. 
In putting forward this argument, Keesing presents an under- 
standing of culture which assumes that the term is meant as an 
adjective rather than a noun, that it is less useful to talk of culture than 
of cultural manifestation, cultural values, cultural discourses and par- 
ticularities, and so on (309). His approach, therefore, suggests a 
change of terminology but also an attempt to salvage a foundational 
term rather than to effect the writing against it that Abu-Lughod 
suggests. Similarly, Arjun Appardurai suggests a shift from culture to 
cultural which, he argues, "moves into a realm of differences, con- 
trasts and comparisons ... which builds on the context-sensitive, con- 
trast-centered heart of Saussurean linguistics" (1996a: 12). However, 
this shift from noun to adjective may not go far enough, as Michael 
Lambek proposes: 
Perhaps one way to avoid the negative repercussions of analytic el- 
egance is to change our conceptual apparatus from nouns to verbs.... It 
is to resurrect Leslie White's (1949) memorable dictum that 'culture is 
culturing'. When culture is reconstructed as verb rather than noun, it is 
no longer discrete or stable and hence cannot be 'captured'. (1995: 275) 
Thus, to talk of culturing reflects a notion of culture as fluid, which 
goes beyond the static, bounded units of traditional anthropology, 
and instead recognizes the negotiated, performed, and contested ele- 
ments of doing culture. Culture as a verb rather than a noun suggests 
that culture is not something that does, but is instead done-culture 
is practiced, or more accurately, one can only understand cultural 
forms when they are manifest in practices. The key point is that 
culture cannot be observed or analyzed, but is instead known 
through manifestation, through being embodied in persons, in ac- 
tions, in discourses, and in particular contexts. 
The fluidity and activity of such a concept of culture (or culturing) 
is expressed quite clearly in James Clifford's (1997) conceptualization 
of 'traveling cultures', through which he seeks to question the as- 
sumption that cultures are fixed with relation to places (see also 
Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Appardurai 1986, 1996b). A deeply held 
perspective in anthropology works on the assumption that culture 
and place are inseparable: to study culture in New Guinea the re- 
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searcher goes to New Guinea and sets up her/his tent in a New 
Guinea village. Being in the place and living with the people gives 
access to the culture of those people. Such a perspective is, of course, 
very much derived from the essentializing primitivism of early an- 
thropology, deriving from the founding fathers of Boas and Mali- 
nowski. But it is not altogether removed from dominant discourses of 
. 
religious studies-to 'understand' Hinduism (or so I have been told) 
the researcher really needs to know India; likewise Islam is best un- 
derstood by reference to its roots in the Middle East. 
Within this model, Clifford argues, there is no room for travel, for 
the unremarked elements of flux and spatial dislocation involved in 
the academic processes of generating accounts of such culture. How 
does the anthropologist get to the village, what other travelers (native 
and non-native) are implicated in the arrival, how is the exit of the 
anthropologist managed? Alongside this, the peoplehe or she is 
studying may also be travelers-not everybody stays still. In western 
countries it is taken for granted that people move about, that tempo- 
rary and permanent dislocation is a very strong element of western 
life. But such experiences of travel and dislocation can be equally 
prolific in even the most 'traditional' of 'village communities', 
whether for reasons of labor migration (seasonal or lifelong), educa- 
tion, trade, pilgrimage, social networking, or curiosity. Just because 
an anthropologist sets up camp to stay in a village it does not mean 
her/his subjects of research will remain still. To illustrate this point, 
Clifford uses as an extreme example the Moe family, a group of 
traditional Hawaiian musicians who had spent fifty-six years 
traveling, on the road, performing their 'authentic' forms of Hawai- 
ian musical culture to international audiences, almost never going 
back to Hawaii (1997: 25). These cultural practices are deemed au- 
thentic and traditional, yet they have taken place not in the locality 
where they are rooted, but en route in hotel rooms and public theaters. 
This example is obviously an extreme case to make a point, but 
the prominence of diasporic cultural manifestations exemplifies such 
traveling cultures equally clearly. It is almost impossible to identify ., 
the locational roots of contemporary British South Asian religious 
and cultural practices-which derive of course from various parts of 
India and Pakistan, but are also shaped by East African influences, 
inter-regional experiences within Indian diasporas, as well as various 
particularities and fluidities of migration to western (and non-west- 
ern) countries. Thus, to understand various manifestations of Hindu 
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religiosity and cultural practice in Britain is not merely a matter of 
looking to see connections and dislocations between parts of Gujarat 
and Punjab (in India) and the people who have settled in Britain. The 
processes of travel, dislocation, and relocation that are ongoing (and 
do not end on the day after migration) are part of the practices of 
culture. The cultural identities and performances that are labeled as 
'Hindu culture' or 'Muslim culture' in Britain are performed out of 
the experiences of the particular, generating unique but authentic 
reinterpretations of such cultures in new contexts. Thus to talk of 
'cultural baggage' is not to refer to a pre-existent and fixed package 
that can be made up post-migration from kit-form like an IKEA 
bookcase; instead, it implies the fluidity of a suitcase of performative 
strategies that can be taken out, worn, and reshaped to fit into the 
lived experiences that emerge from the processes of travel (and settle- 
ment). In this respect, the culture to be identified is not the clothes 
within the suitcase, but the practices and discourses through which 
those 'clothes' are worn, performed, and contextualized. The aca- 
demic stress therefore shifts from looking at the reinterpretation of 
the culture of the cultural baggage, to the culturing (and reculturing) 
of the performances out of the baggage. 
It is, of course, an important point to make that these are aca- 
demic reflections on critical analyses of cultural practice. From a 
'native point of view' the discourses may well be working on a differ- 
ent level; there may well be talk of 'our culture' and 'their culture', 
that 'we' (as a culture and a community) have a particular way of 
doing things that needs to be preserved (and essentialized). Gerd 
Baumann describes this as the difference between demotic and dominant 
discourses on culture: "the dominant discourse views 'culture' as the 
reified possession of 'ethnic' groups or 'communities"', whilst "the 
demotic discourse questions and dissolves this equation between 'cul- 
ture', ethnos, and 'community'" (1997: 209). Scholars can be impli- 
cated in helping to produce such reified dominant discourses of cul- 
tural purity at local levels (for example through the production and 
perpetuation of the concept of Hindu cultural and religious unity), 
but they can be equally guilty of berating their subjects for failing to 
see that their 'cultures' are imagined, reinvented, and reconstructed. 
Baumann suggests that both perspectives can be too extreme, that 
critical scholarship should recognize the operation of both demotic 
and dominant discourses at the level of practice. That is, very often 
the practice of culture involves a 'dual discursive competency'. The 
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experience of culture is very often a juxtaposition of people reifying 
their 'culture' whilst simultaneously being "aware of remaking, re- 
shaping, and reforming" it (214). The art of the scholarly observer of 
such processes operates at the various levels of discursive and political 
practice, and indeed one of the challenges to such an observer is to 
remain aware of how s/he-as a scholar and as a participant-is also 
implicated in these processes. 
4. Deconstructions of religion 
Having mapped out some fundamental reconceptualizations within 
anthropology over the question of culture, it also needs to be stated 
plainly that these perspectives have profound implications on the 
ways in which scholars of religion should be thinking about their 
material. The principle that particular religious manifestations are 
related to particular cultures is paradigmatic within the contempo- 
rary discipline. But the full implications of what a deconstruction of 
the 'culture concept' would mean to the particularities of religious 
studies have yet to be explored. Nor has there been much in the way 
of sustained engagement with a crucial article by Talal Asad-now 
more than fifteen years since it was published-which can be read on 
one level as a refutation of Geertz's approach, and on a different (but 
related level) as a Foucauldian undermining of the purposes of study- 
ing religion. 
In a paper that was first published under the title of "Anthropo- 
logical Conceptions of Religion" in 1983 (and was subsequently re- 
published in a collection of his papers in 1993) Talal Asad uses as his 
starting point an extended review and critique of Clifford Geertz's 
highly influential paper "Religion as Cultural System" (1973a). Ini- 
tially, Asad presented his argument as an "exploration and not refu- 
tation" (1983: 237l of Geertz's definition of religion, 10 although the 
9 On republishing the essay in 1993 in a collection of his work, Asad modified this 
to describe his own essay as a "not primarily critical review of Geertz's ideas on 
religion-if this had been my aim I would have addressed myself to the entire corpus . 
of his writings on religion in Indonesia and Morocco" (1993: 29). In the ten years 
between the initial and subsequent publications, Asad had obviously moved away 
from feeling such necessity to show deference to the school of anthropology which 
Geertz represented. '° Geertz's well-known definition of religion is that "a religion" is a "system of 
symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and long lasting moods and 
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end-product is a substantial problematization of Geertz's analysis. 
Asad's concern is to locate Geertz's definition (and the many other 
such universalizing definitions of religion) within a Foucauldian po- 
litical history of knowledge. What Asad is primarily trying to show is 
the genealogy of how Geertz came to feel it was reasonable to think 
of religion in the way he did, as a system of symbols, etc. That is, 
Asad provides an exploration of how academic discourses on religion 
are related to the social contexts in which they are embedded. 
In particular Asad questions the social and political forces that 
have structured the ways of thinking of anthropologists and other 
writers on religious theory. This leads him to conclude that "there 
cannot be a universal definition of religion, not only because its con- 
stituent elements and relationships are historically specific, but be- 
cause that definition is itself the historical product of discursive proc- 
esses" (1993: 29). 
The connection between religious theory and practice is fundamentally 
a matter of intervention-of constructing religion in the world (not in 
the mind) through definitional discourses, interpreting true meanings, 
excluding some utterances and practices and including others. Hence 
my repeated question: how does theoretical discourse actually define religion? 
(44, emphasis added) 
Thus, Asad argues against western academic assumptions that reli- 
gion is 'out there' to be studied, and that indeed it is necessary to 
recognize that these assumptions are themselves part of a discourse 
which has its uses primarily for academics to define the subjects of 
their studies." "The anthropological student of particular religions 
should therefore begin from this point, in a sense unpacking the 
comprehensive concept which he or she translates as 'religion' into 
heterogeneous elements according to its historical character" (54, 
emphasis in original). 
There has, of course, been almost endless debate within the study 
of religion (across the many branches that make up the discipline) of 
what the term 'religion' is intended to refer to, of how it should (or 
motivations in men [sic] by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence 
and clothing those conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and 
motivations seem uniquely realistic" (1973a: 90). " I think it is worth comparing this position with Jonathan Z. Smith's classic 
quote that: "Religion is solely the creation of the scholar's study. It is created for the 
scholar's analytic purposes by his [sic] imaginative acts of comparison and generali- 
zation. Religion has no independent existence apart from the academy' (1982: xi). 
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should not) be defined and understood (e.g., Clarke and Byrne 1993; 
Pals 1996), and indeed Geertz's own contribution to this debate 
(1973a) has been extremely significant. What Asad is arguing, how- 
ever, is something different: that is, the academic is not a neutral part 
of these processes of definition, and the discourses that are used by 
academics (in the study of religion, or any other discipline) emerge 
out of a particular political situation. Thus the strategy of talking of 
religion (like culture) sets up, and is determined by, certain sets of 
power relations-and is very often a means by which a group or 
location is defined as other. 
' 
This approach is made explicit by David Scott, writing about how 
certain religious manifestations in Sri Lanka came to be labeled as 
'demonic' in academic discourses (following from Christian mission- 
aries centuries before). 
Part of the problem to be sketched and investigated therefore has pre- 
cisely to do with the instability of what gets identified and counted by 
authorized knowledges as 'religion': how, by whom, and under what 
conditions of power. The point is that the determining conditions of 
what gets categorised as 'religion' are historically and culturally vari- 
able, a fact that anthropologists too often ignore in their attempts to 
identify universal effects and essential processes. (1992: 333) 
Rather than taking religion (or religions) as a given, this approach 
assumes that the term creates a discursive field into which predomi- 
nantly western scholars place difference. This religion is seen as 
somehow in opposition to scientific, commonsensical, or practical 
knowledge,'2 and although particular 'religions' may engage with 
such forms of rationality 'they' will still be considered by definition as 
irrational (or having 'their own' form of rationality). 
I find there are remarkable parallels to be drawn here with Abu- 
Lughod's comments about the practice of research on the culture 
concept within such a framework by "feminists and halfies" (1991). 
In particular, the fact that the concept of engagement and positio- 
nality in the study of religion has remained an unresolved problem 
(what has come to be know as the insider/outsider debate; see 
McCutcheon 1999). That is, such a construction of difference- 
through the fixity of the 'religious' subject / 'non-religious' scholar- 
leaves no space between the two positions, and in effect produces a 
12 For elaborations of this idea see Geertz (1973b: 111-112, 119-122) and Leach 
(1969: 93, 107-108). 
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hierarchical relationship in which the scholar is empowered through 
his or her ability to define what particular types of knowledge are 
valid. At its most extreme this discourse produces 'explanations' or 
'reductions' of religion, with the scholar in a position to give a judge- 
ment on what the 'religion' is 'really about'. The other extreme is 
seen most clearly in a piece of research in which the researcher 'goes 
[or is already] native', and so is challenged to show a critical detach- 
ment from her/his religious assumptions. Such an option is where 
Abu-Lughod locates halfie research, for example a Muslim studying 
within an Islamic context, or indeed a Christian studying within a 
Christian context.' 3 
When conducting fieldwork in rural France, the anthropologist 
Jeanne Favret-Saada came to the conclusion that whilst there she 
needed to adopt a particular strategy towards the discourses on 
witchcraft which she found so prolific: "to understand the meaning of 
this discourse [the 'gift' of unwitching, 'seeing everything'] there is no 
other solution but to practice it oneself, to become one's own inform- 
ant" (1980: 22). Likewise, Karen McCarthy Brown found that she 
was happy to allow a considerable breaking down of the distinction 
between herself (as white female academic) and New York Haitian 
Vodou practitioners, clients, and the healing/spiritual methods they 
used. However, in her case she found it necessary to place herself as 
separate from what she experienced: 
One of the major risks involved losing the important distinction be- 
tween Vodou interacting with the life of a Haitian and Vodou interact- 
ing with my own very different blend of experience, memory, dream, 
and fantasy. My experiences with Vodou both are and are not like 
those of Haitians. (1991 : 11) 
When writing up these experiences she recognized that the stories she 
told "have authority only in the territory between cultures" ( 11 ), and 
to get into this space she had to "open up her life" in ways which 
seemed to take her some distance from the expectations of normative 
ethnography. Although she did not herself explore this, it is clear that 
the static conceptualization of 'culture' and 'religion' both help to 
reinforce the ways in which she (and others) try to think about such 
difference. That is, her experiences were different from those of the 
13 And of course there are many different ways in which one can be a `Muslim' or 
'Christian'. 
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New York Haitians, and the discourses and practices gave her very 
different assumptions about her own (and others') experiences, but to 
describe this as placing her between two cultures, or religions, or . 
between religion and non-religion is grossly to over-simplify the sce- 
nario. The particularities of the context, of the cultural and religious 
practices which she saw performed and participated in, are what 
gives rise to her complex ethnography, which gives a particular view 
of what is essentialized by many discourses as 'Vodou religion'. 
Pursuing Abu-Lughod's critique of culture, therefore, it may be a 
useful strategy to write against religion, that is, to find other ways of 
talking about what are thought of as religious manifestations without 
calling them religions. I think this is a challenging proposition, al- 
though a very difficult one. In some respects, it is easier to write 
against culture rather than religion, learning instead new ways of 
writing about discourses, practices, and so on. In non-western (non- 
Christian) contexts it may be possible to follow such a strategy with 
regard to religion: in places where the abstraction of religious prac- 
tice is so much a western imposition-where 'religion' and 'culture' 
are so intertwined-that what is described as religion is as much 
culture anyway. Indeed, it may even be worth considering removing 
the term and concept of religion altogether and working on the as- 
sumption that what it is used to identify is usually located within 
discourses of cultural action (that is, within cultural practices and 
discourses-within culturing). 
There are, however, a number of reasons why it is highly unlikely 
that the term 'religion' (and 'religions') will be abandoned altogether. 
On a disciplinary level, of course, it would suggest a disbandonment 
of the political domain of religious studies within universities. If reli- 
gion scholars saw their focus as cultural practice rather than religious 
practice then the existence of 'religious studies' would be somewhat 
like a performance of the play Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. 
The practice of the study of religion would therefore need to take 
place in other departments-whether they be anthropology, cultural 
studies, sociology, philosophy, or wherever. Putting this prospect 
aside, there remains a commonly held sense that 'religion' needs to 
be distinguished as somehow a particular kind of cultural form: per- 
haps in the same way as 'literature' or 'media' are particular cultural 
forms that need to be distinguished. This is supported by the very 
observable fact that religion is not only an 'academic' term, it is used 
very much on levels of popular and political discourse in most parts 
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of the world. Religion scholars (particularly scholars of contemporary 
religious practices) study people who consider themselves to 'have 
religions'. To extend Baumann's (1997) discussion, it is possible to 
talk about dominant (constructive) and demotic (deconstructive) dis- 
courses on religion. Thus, a writing of religion which attempts not 
only to write against but also to write out both culture and religion is 
probably going too far, and indeed there is a vaguely justifiable case 
to be made that the concept of 'religion' creates a discursive space 
which is significant enough to explore.'4 However, the concept of 
religion does still require some considerable rethinking, with the pos- 
sibility of abandoning many of the 'taken for granted' ideas (regimes 
of truth) that those working in the discipline live with on the day-to- 
day. 
5. Religion as practice 
The concepts of culture and religion have thus received a strong 
reconsideration in various quarters in recent years, and the same can 
be said for the long used concept of ritual. In a densely presented 
theoretical overview of the topic, Catherine Bell's (1992) work on 
ritual theory and ritual practice brings into question the ways in 
which ritual is commonly presented as an essentialized form of ac- 
tion. The objectification of 'ritual' as a thing in itself is usually made 
"to solve the problems posed for scholars by their reliance on a 
distinction between thought and action" (Bell 1992: 48). This distinc- 
tion is by no means neutral in itself, since within it there is a funda- 
mental privileging of thought over action: "it differentiates a 'think- 
ing' subject from an 'acting' object-or, when pushed to its logical 
conclusion, a 'thinking' subject from a 'nonthinking' object" (47). 
Such an approach is readily observed within traditional studies of 
religion which look to religious texts and doctrines as the objects of 
`religions';'5 but, as Bell shows, this is only partially overcome by the 
" As a particular type of interdisciplinary project I think there is a lot to be said 
for the convergence of religious studies as a discipline. This multidisciplinarity gives 
the potential for religious studies (departments, conferences, journals, etc.) to be (or 
become) a useful 'space' for discussions without ever clearly demarcating where the 
boundaries are meant to lie between religious and other cultural practices (or even if 
there should be any such boundaries). 15 Jonathan Spencer (1995: 210) points out how, in the academic study of Bud- 
dhism (particularly what has been done by 'textual scholars'), "the Pali canon has 
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anthropological focus on ritual as a mediator or expressor of thought 
through action. Where ritual action is considered, it is very often 
assumed that such ritual is the acting out (or performance) of world 
views or beliefs. 
As a means of overcoming this fundamental dichotomy of 
thought-action, Bell makes use of Pierre Bourdieu's practice theory 
which suggests a location of action within thought and vice versa. 
She focuses in particular on Bourdieu's (1977, 1992) concept of habi- , 
tus, which she glosses as "the set of habitual dispositions through 
which people 'give shape and form to social conventions'... and the 
matrix in which objective structures are realized within the (subjec- 
tive) dispositions that produce practices" (Bell 1992: 79).'6 Thus, she 
argues, it is more helpful to talk of "the sense of ritual" or "ritualiza- 
tion", which is not some 'thing' which 'does', but is instead itself done 
(practiced) by actors/agents who strategize and improvize according 
to context and their own particular circumstances. 
I would agree with Bell that this use of practice theory" has con- 
siderable advantages for any study of religious manifestations 
(whether they be ritualization, discourses, or even forms of textual 
and other literate productions). As Stirrat suggests: 
understanding what is called 'religion' involves understanding religious 
practice. By this I mean religion is something which people do: for my 
purposes it does not exist in so far as people act, speak, and reflect as 
beings in the world.... whole field of religious practice has to be 
viewed as a field of struggle and dispute, as individuals and groups 
attempt to impose their practices and their understandings on others. 
And it is through such debate that new forms of religious expression 
and understanding are created. (1992: 11) 
been identified with 'original' and therefore pure Theravada Buddhism, to the sys- 
tematic exclusion of evidence from archaeology and the vernacular Theravada coun- 
tries, which might broaden our understanding of the many possible Buddhisms there 
have been in Buddhist history." In doing so, "ethnographic studies of Buddhism 
have served to render this identification problematic, even as they reproduce its 
assumptions." Spencer's underlying premise is that each historically and culturally 
constructed expression of Theravada Buddhism is as valid as any other (whether it be 
perceived as 'pure' or otherwise by western scholars or anyone else). '6 The quote Bell uses is from Anthony Giddens's review of Pierre Bourdieu's 
Distinction (the review was published in Partisan Review [1986] 53 [2]). In Bourdieu's 
own words, habits is described as "systems of durable, transposable dispositions, 
structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as 
principles which generate and organize practices and representations" (1992: 53). " For further consideration of practice theory, see Ortner (1984) and de Certeau 
(1984). 
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That is, what tends to be thought of as religion is poorly represented 
as a distinction between 'belief (doctrine) and 'ritual', but is (if any- 
thing) a continuity of practice that comes together in particular ma- 
terial locations. Such locations are most often people's bodies 
(through the actions they perform, and the words that they speak; see 
Asad 1997; Turner 1984), but religious manifestations can also be 
located in objects (such as texts) and places, such as religious (or 
sacred) sites (Chidester and Linenthal 1995). However, I would argue 
that Bell's rephrasing of ritual as ritualization does not go far enough, 
since although I agree that it is helpful to reconceptualize ritualized 
practice as ritualization (rather than ritual as an essence), the use of a 
noun still suggests something tangible that has its own agency, rather 
than as a form of expressing the agency of the people who actually do 
the practice. 
6. Religion, religious practice, religionin?? 
The concept of religion is as intangible as the concept of culture, and 
yet academic constructions of both create discourses that encourage 
scholars to talk as if they are 'things' with tangible forms. Somehow 
an anthropologist can go to New Guinea and find a people's culture, 
and a religion scholar can go to India (or read Sanskrit texts) to 
research Hinduism, Islam, or any other religion and make her/his 
contribution to our critical understandings of that particular religious 
tradition. As Baumann notes, the dominant reifying discourse of cul- 
ture [or religion]-as-a-thing is part of the discourses of the people 
who are studied, even when at the same time they are being chal- 
lenged by the counter-demotic discourses of creativity. But the fact 
that many 'Hindus' consider that they are 'Hindu' makes the study of 
'Hinduism' a lot easier to practice. It is possible to deconstruct this, 
and show that Hinduism is an historical construction that has a 
particular political history (and very serious contemporary effects), 
and yet to talk as if Hinduism is 'merely' a discursive creation is to 
bypass the significance of the concept as part of the popular discur- 
sive identities and practices of many ('Hindu') people. 
This is not to say that scholars should write the same discourses, 
nor indeed should they step back from being implicated in helping to 
shape some aspects of those discourses. Good scholarship should, 
however, bear in mind that there are different ways of considering a 
subject, and that an alternative perspective opens up new vistas of 
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representation and possibly understanding. One possible alternative 
vista could be borrowed from the discussions of culture, cultural 
practice, and culturing. That is, I would suggest that religion scholars 
not only learn to reconsider how they think of culture, but at the 
same time they should make a similar conceptual shift with their use 
of the term religion. That is, the practice of religious studies should 
not be the 'study of religion', but the study of religious practices-of 
religioning. 
' 
If we try to talk of religioning rather than religion the result is a 
completely different set of expectations. Religioning is not a thing, 
with an essence, to be defined and explained. Religioning is a form of 
practice, like other cultural practices, that is done and performed by 
actors with their own agency (rather than being subsumed by their 
religions), who have their own particular ways and experiences of 
making their religiosities manifest. A discourse of religioning also 
moves away from looking at 'religion' in terms of 'religions' (Christi- 
anity, Islam, Hinduism, etc.), but instead looks at religious influences 
and religious creativities, and the political dynamics through which 
certain conceptualization of religious authenticity are produced and 
maintained. 18 
I would agree very strongly with Rosalind Shaw and Charles 
Stewart's argument that all religious manifestations are particular, 
hybridized/syncretic blends produced by complex historical and cul- 
tural interactions, and that "all religions have composite origins and 
are continually reconstructed through ongoing processes of synthesis 
and erasure" (1994: 7). Thus what gives a certain complex of reli- 
gious manifestations the authenticity and the legitimacy of the status 
of 'religion' is "a discursive matter involving power, rhetoric and 
persuasion. Thus both putatively pure and putatively syncretic tradi- 
tions can be 'authentic' if people claim that these traditions are 
unique" (7). A study of religioning moves beyond looking at, for 
example, how Christianity has been manifest in certain historical 
eras, and instead focuses on how certain practices have been included 
and excluded from hegemonic discourses on what Christianity is 
thought to be. All the various cultural, religious, and political mani- 
festations which have at different times been labeled as 'Christianity' 
'8 I find it interesting that there is some congruence between my suggestion to 
speak of "religion" as a verb (as religioning), and Mary Daly's recommendation that 
"God" be reconceived as a verb (Daly 1979, quoted in Gold 2000). 
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are syncretized and authenticated forms of practice. The conceptual- 
izing of religion as religioning in this respect, therefore, focuses on 
how these different forms of religioning are indeed different from 
each other, but also how certain political discourses and practices 
have achieved the valuable status of legitimacy as the same 'thing' 
(i.e., Christianity). 
Similarly, a religioning perspective makes us expect to find the 
multiple contextual forms of Hinduism that have led western scholars 
(and students) to despair when they have tried to 'understand' what 
Hinduism 'is'. The variety of Hindu practices and manifestations is 
not unique to those who are called (and call themselves) Hindu; an 
equitable level of diversity of practice and context can be found 
among the many manifestations of what is considered as 'authentic' 
Christian religious practice. What is perhaps more remarkable (from 
a western, christocentric perspective) is that the hegemonizing strate- 
gies of certain dominant discourses have not produced such a level of 
consistency and political unity of religious practice (and religioning) 
among Hindus as has been the case among other globalizing reli- 
gious groupings. 
The conceptualization of religioning, therefore, is intended to fo- 
cus scholarly attention on the ways in which religious identities, 
manifestations and power relations are produced through practice 
and through performance. Or to put this another way, the subject of 
study of scholars in this field is such practices, along with the dis- 
courses which shape and are shaped by them. 
7. Religion, anthropology., and cultural studies 
The problematic dialectic between religious studies and postmodern 
conceptualizations of religion has led some analysts to suggest a 
subsumation of the discipline with the broader field of cultural studies 
(Fitzgerald 1995, 1999; King 1999). I do not have too many difficul- 
ties with such suggestions, particularly because much of what I have 
discussed above has come from a similarly fruitful dialogue between 
anthropology and cultural studies. However, I would like to argue 
that any such reconstruction of the discipline of religious studies 
needs to keep in focus the distinctive contributions of contemporary 
anthropologists as much as those in cultural studies, as well as the 
marginal areas between the two. 
At the level of broad generalization, I would certainly suggest that 
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an overemphasis on religion/cultural studies at the expense of an- 
thropology would miss out to a large extent on the rich empirical 
vein in anthropology. Although both approaches are to a large extent 
discursive, the long tradition in anthropology of fieldwork as a basic 
component of research very much creates a theoretical outlook that is 
rooted in actual practices and experiences (of religion, or any other 
forms of cultural practices). Thus I would still strongly endorse Mali- 
nowski's rallying cry to "come down off the verandah" (Malinowski 
1978 [1927]), albeit with a critical edge that recognizes the academic 
and political constructions that are made through the processes of 
writing up such direct experiences. In general contrast to this I (along 
with many other anthropologists) find the emphasis on textuality 
within much of what is considered as cultural studies to be problem- 
atic. That is, although texts (whether they be sacred or any other 
form of literature) are very often extremely important in both the 
production of various forms of power and knowledge and in the lived 
experiences of people, the contextualizations of such texts are equally 
important. 
As a rather obvious example of this, it is worth citing Homi 
Bhabha's much used concept of hybridity (1994), which is drawn 
from his highly sophisticated and politically aware reading of literary 
texts-particularly postcolonial texts that were produced out of inter- 
active encounters between people of British and Indian backgrounds. 
Although the concept of hybridity is an extremely powerful means of 
discussing cultural complexities (and which offers an alternative slant 
to what is otherwise called creolization [Hannerz 1992]), Bhabha's 
stress on the importance of literary texts as loci of hybridity is rather 
limiting. Such hybridizations occur and come out of a range of dis- 
cursive and non-discursive practices. Thus, as Peter van der Veer 
writes: 
Bhabha's claim that one can bring newness into the world, that one can 
reinvent oneself when one is writing from the cultural interstices, is a 
conceit of the literature-producing and consuming world.... [I]t is cru- 
cial to go beyond the analysis of literary discourses and representations 
to the social, political and economic contexts in which they are embed- 
ded. There may be nothing outside of the text, as Derrida proposes, but 
there is certainly something outside the literary text. (1997: 102, 103)" 
11 
Spivak (1993) and Moore-Gilbert (1997: 82-91) have argued that this interpre- 
tation of Derrida is misleading, since Derrida's conceptualization of texts encom- 
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Discursive analyses of discursive literary texts can provide very useful 
and complex reconstructions and deconstructions of particular cul- 
tural forms, as well as power relations and performances. However, 
like all other forms of analytic study, such an approach is limited by 
the fact that they only produce partial truths of complex realities 
(Clifford 1986). Anthropological practice, no matter where its loca- 
tion, can offer alternatives of discursive analyses of the non-literary 
practices which engage with and help to shape literary productions. 
This tension between anthropology and cultural studies is indeed 
an important one to address in respect to any reconceptualization of 
religious studies as a form of cultural studies. The general inclination 
towards textuality on the part of many cultural studies theorists and 
writers can have the effect of reproducing a persistent weakness of 
'traditional' religious studies: that is the privileging of texts over con- 
texts. I recall overhearing a statement made by a religious studies 
student at SOAS, London, when in conversation with a friend study- 
ing in the anthropology department: when asked how religionists 
deal with issues of representations of the people they study, the stu- 
dent replied that from her experience "religious studies doesn't have 
any people, they just have their texts" (Nye 1994). Over the past 
twenty years there has been a considerable shift away from the view 
that the study of religion is the study of religious texts, but there 
remains a substantial school of opinion within the discipline that a 
sound knowledge of any particular 'religion' or tradition requires a 
deep philological knowledge of that religion's canonical texts. Indeed 
the first-wave engagement with anthropology and ethnographic re- 
search has helped to produce new perspectives on historical and 
contemporary contextualities of important texts which are now very 
much an established part of the 'religious studies' approach. 
A shift into a new form of religious/cultural studies which re- 
turned to such a privileging of texts would, in my opinion, be a step 
backwards-even if it did lead to the introduction of theoretically 
compelling approaches. I would certainly agree that the range of 
texts for a cultural analysis should be broadened, so that the focus is 
not only on 'sacred' or canonical texts. Thus, for example, students of 
passes the wider sphere of 'context' that is read as lacking in his analysis. Although 
this defense of Derrida may be justifiable, the over-textuality and under-contextuality 
of Bhabha is, I believe, a legitimate criticism (although see Bhabha [1990] for an 
example of his more contextually engaged work). 
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contemporary western Islam may perhaps need to understand the 
hermeneutics not only of the Qu'ran and the Sharia, but also of 
Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses and its critics.20 But so long as the 
focus remains exclusively on forms of literature and textuality I would 
argue that this new approach is merely a creation of an alternative 
theology of texts, or a postmodern philology. In some cases this ap- 
proach can and does widen out into studies of hypertextuality and 
filmic/visual textualities, but the deep contextuality that gives rise to 
the textualities remain hidden, and to a large extent ignored. What I 
would argue that anthropological practices can add is that such tex- 
tual studies can be located within the complex and diverse non- 
textual (and sometimes non-discursive) practices that help to shape 
and be shaped by manifest texts. 
In this respect, the various shapings, reconceptualizations, and re- 
constructions of contemporary Islamic practices and identities in 
Britain cannot be approached with exclusive reference to the text of 
The Satanic Verses (and other writings by Rushdie and his critics) alone. 
Bhabha's conceptualization of cultural hybridity may work extremely 
well for a particular person such as Rushdie himself, but gives only a 
partial view on the multifarious ways in which Islamic practice is 
actually practiced and conceived in British contexts in the aftermath 
of the Rushdie affair. By privileging Rushdie's particular form of 
hybridity, other less literate (and indeed less bourgeois) forms of 
hybridity are marginalized. 
The practice of anthropology is itself prone to lead to a privileging 
of certain groups and concepts and marginalizing others, as was of 
course shown most clearly by the critiques that emerged out of the 
Writirtg Culture debates. Anthropologists can claim to speak for 'others' 
(that is, those in other cultures), and yet in doing so help to construct 
the sense of otherness that they are claiming to breakdown (Asad 
1986; Fabian 1983). However, the meeting ground between anthro- 
pology and cultural studies has produced a very rich field of theoreti- 
'° Indeed a case could almost be made that TIe Satanic Verses has itself become a 
'sacred text' for postmodern and postcolonial theorists. This is not so much in terms 
of any theological position that the author Rushdie presents, but rather with respect 
to his narrativization of the forms of cultural hybridization and newness that writers 
such as Homi Bhabha have articulated in more academic terms. The number of 
times that Rushdie's volume is cited and shown deference to by citation (or 
worshiped?) within this particular discursive is certainly a point worth extended 
consideration. 
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cal and methodological engagements that have created a large meas- 
ure of critical reflection on the discursive and political contextualities 
of the empirical research through which cultural contextualizations 
are generated.2' It is precisely within this general field that I would 
recommend that the discipline of religious studies be developed, 
rather than risk the very real possibility that the academic production 
of knowledge within the discipline become increasingly isolated from 
other humanities subject approaches. Thus, to paraphrase the an- 
thropologist Terence Turner: 
If [religious studies] is going to make a contribution to the new aca- 
demic approaches to culture emerging out of cultural studies and multi- 
. culturalist curricula, it will not be by simply sitting still and waiting to be 
consulted because we had [religion and] culture first. [Religionists] will 
have to engage actively and critically with multiculturalist formulations 
to demonstrate that they have valuable theoretical points and relevant 
critical perspectives to contribute. (1993: 421?2 
Just as anthropologists have had to open up their perspectives and 
accept the inevitable problematics with their 'culture concept', so too 
those who profess a study a religion also need to do some serious 
rethinking of what kinds of entities they are trying to talk about with 
the concept of 'religion'. Whether the reconceptualization produces a 
new discursive terminology of religious practice or religioning is less 
important that a broad recognition that the types of practices that are 
debated within the disciplinary field are significant elements of cul- . 
tural, national, and political constructions in many different global 
and local contexts (or ethnoscapes [Appardurai 1991]). However, to 
communicate with those in other disciplinary fields such as cultural 
studies, postcolonial studies, poststructuralism, and anthropology, 
there needs to be a recognition that 'our' (religious studies) discourses 
need to accommodate developments outside. 
In conclusion, therefore, I would suggest that there are three pos- 
sible ways in which religious studies could develop to meet these 
2' As examples of written products of this discursive field I would recommend the 
journals Public Culture, Cultural Anthropology, and American Anthropologist, collections of 
papers by Richard Fox (1991), Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson (1997), James 
Clifford (1997), as well as the outline of possible research agendas discussed in the 
final chapter of Gerd Baumann's book on multiculturalism (1999). 22 The substituted words in this quote are 'religious studies' for 'anthropology' and 
'religionists' for 'anthropologists'. My hope is that the polemical advice is as relevant 
for the audience that I am addressing as it was for Turner's audience of a 'main- 
stream' cultural anthropology journal. 
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challenges of postmodern critiques of the subject. One possibility is 
the one I discussed above, that is, by accepting that religion depart- 
ments have been too artificially constructed around an anachronistic 
object of study. That is, there is no place for seeing religion as some- 
thing separate from other cultural manifestations, and thus (in a 
sense) dissolve religious studies into the meeting ground between cul- 
tural studies and anthropology. 
The second possibility, a little less radical but still transformative of 
the discipline, would be to recreate religious studies as an adjunct of 
this interdisciplinary project, as something like 'religion and culture'. 
This would add a cross-cultural global edge which could provide a 
useful critique of some of the narrow parochialism (both ethnocentric 
and Eurocentric) of a number of poststructuralist and postmodern 
debates. The third possibility-which I am particularly suggesting in 
this paper-is that there should at least be a rethinking of the vo- 
cabulary and discourse of the discipline, that is, to think of and 
discuss religion as something which is done, as a practice, as 
religioning. 
- 
University of Stirling 
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